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Abstract: In this paper, we present the Inter-Institutional Gap (IIG) framework 
as a novel approach to conceptualizing the often-overlooked interconnectivity of 
different rule-levels between formal and informal institutions in a natural resource 
system. This framework goes beyond the existing concepts of legal pluralism, 
institutional void, structural hole, and cultural mismatch, each of which offer 
valuable insights to particular gaps between formal and informal institutions, but 
do not sufficiently address the interaction at every rule level (i.e. constitutional 
choice, collective choice and operational choice rules). In order to demonstrate 
the potential of our framework for better understanding the underlying causes of 
inter-institutional gaps, we apply it to four case studies that encompass diverse 
geographical locations, governance levels, and social-ecological systems. Results 
reveal that institutional gaps tend to exist when there are unintended, unforeseen 
or hidden gaps between the different rule levels operating among the different 
institutions involved in governing a single resource system. More specifically we 
observe that: (i) inter-institutional gaps are co-existing, therefore if a certain gap 
is identified, other gaps may be expected; (ii) certain gaps may reveal latent gaps; 
and (iii) intermediaries may be key to addressing inter-institutional gaps. In many 
cases, sustainable natural resource management and regulation cannot be achieved 
without directly addressing the inter-institutional gaps that exist between formal 
and informal institutions operating in the same resource system. The framework 
facilitates analysis and understanding of multi-level governance structures in pur-
suit of addressing complex natural resource management issues.
Keywords: Collaboration, governance systems, public policy, rules-in-use, sus-
tainable development, top-down approaches.
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1. Introduction
Natural resource governance in coupled social and ecological systems often 
involves multi-level interactions between formal and informal institutions based 
on agreed-upon rules (Cash et al. 2006; Poteete 2012). When such interactions 
are absent or there are insufficient rules, disparity and incoherence can arise 
between institutions managing the same resource, potentially posing a challenge 
to  sustainable natural resource governance (Acheson 2006; Rahman et al. 2012). 
Such challenges, if unnoticed or not adequately addressed, can lead to conflict and 
degradation of natural resources as well as undesired outcomes for the stakehold-
ers involved (Berkes 2002; Rastogi 2014). In this paper, we refer to the absence of 
rule-based interactions as ‘inter-institutional gaps’. These inter-institutional gaps 
can reveal a lack of productive collaboration between stakeholders, undermin-
ing the potential for collaboration, and ultimately, sustainable resource manage-
ment (Sokile et al. 2003). While we know these inter-institutional gaps are widely 
encountered in the literature (Drèze and Sen 2002; Poteete 2012), to our knowl-
edge, a systematic framework to analyze, understand and identify such gaps is 
lacking.
Institutions involved in natural resource management are typically divided 
into two categories: ‘formal’ and ‘informal’ (North 1991; Grigsby 2002). North 
(1991) defined ‘formal’ as a de jure body of rulemaking and enforcement in a 
hierarchical organizational structure, accompanied by codified norms of behavior 
and bureaucratic polity. In contrast, ‘informal’ refers to a rule system that largely 
lacks such official codification, and thus typically comprises habitual, verbal-
ized, or customary rules, and conducts, which function as the de facto rulemaking 
and enforcement body. Conflict has been commonly observed both in the form 
of the informal practices of local communities being negatively and substan-
tially impacted by centralized (often post-colonial) formal regimes (North 1991; 
Grigsby 2002), as well as resistance by communities and their associated informal 
institutions to government policy (Young 2006). Despite the intrinsic differences 
that often challenge collaborative interactions between these institutions, existing 
natural resource management research shows that such interactions are crucial 
to promoting the long-term sustainable use of natural resources and the adaptive 
capacity of resource users across scales and levels (Dietz et al. 2003; Cash et al. 
2006). Gibson et al. (2000) and Cash et al. (2006, 2) define scale as ‘the spatial, 
temporal, quantitative, or analytical dimensions used to measure and study any 
phenomenon, and levels as the unit of analysis that are located at different posi-
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tions on a scale’. This paper presents an analytical framework designed to better 
understand the rule-level interactions between formal and informal institutions in 
natural resource management.
2. Background
North’s (1991) widely-used definition of formal and informal institutions recog-
nizes their foundational differences in the areas of rule-making and enforcement 
(Grigsby 2002); however, efforts to diagnose inter-institutional gaps have not 
adequately addressed the missing or insufficient interactions between the institu-
tions. Since rules are the prerequisites for enforcement, it is for this reason we use 
rule-making as a novel entry point into better understanding inter-institutional 
gaps. Our approach draws on Ostrom et al. (1994)’s multi-level rule hierarchy 
described in the Institutional Analysis and Development (IAD) framework and 
subsequently the Social Ecological Systems (SES) framework (Ostrom 2007, 
2009). Both these frameworks suggest that institutions are arranged into three 
layers of ‘rules-in-use’ (hereafter called rule levels): operational choice, collec-
tive choice, and constitutional choice rules (McGinnis and Ostrom 2014). This 
hierarchy of rules-in-use has been applied to analyzing common-pool resource 
issues across numerous case studies and has consistently demonstrated linkages 
between insufficient inter-institutional interactions and resource management 
failures (Imperial 1999; Agrawal 2001; Agrawal and Ostrom 2001; Carlsson and 
Berkes 2005; Gibson 2005). 
By integrating formal and informal institutions and their corresponding rule 
levels that govern actions into a matrix, we present an analytical framework 
embedded within the broader SES framework to better capture the interplay 
between formal and informal institutions (Pahl-Wostl 2009; Garmestani and 
Benson 2013; Epstein et al. 2015). Notably, some recent initiatives have been 
undertaken to make the SES framework more compatible with other natural 
resource based approaches, such as the ecosystem service framework and tele-
coupled environmental governance (Challies et al. 2014; Partelow and Winkler 
2016). While the purpose of these initiatives is to situate governance mecha-
nisms in resource management frameworks within the broader social-ecological 
systems concept (Ban et al. 2015), the objective of the IIG framework is to 
facilitate the analysis of multi-level governance mechanisms, a missing com-
ponent in the previous initiatives. More specifically, we aim to contribute to 
an enhanced understanding of the ‘action situation’ of institutional analysis, 
widely considered the ‘black box’ of natural resource management policy deci-
sions (Ostrom 2011). According to the SES framework, an action situation is the 
domain in which resource users and governing actors come to interact (Ostrom 
2011). Here, we recognize that the analysis of any action situation requires that 
it be grounded in a consideration of historic and place-specific cultural and 
political contingences (Cote and Nightingale 2012). We subsequently employ 
Ostrom’s rule hierarchy in the IIG framework in an effort to provide a lens for 
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inter-institutional analysis that is applicable to action situations cross-culturally 
(Anderies et al. 2004; Ostrom 2010). However, in analyzing action situations, 
Ostrom’s SES framework has been critiqued for not sufficiently considering 
processes of social and political change (Cote and Nightingale 2012). As we 
situate the IIG framework within Ostrom’s SES framework, we realize that it 
inherits this limitation. 
In what follows, we conceptualize the often overlooked interconnectivity of 
rule-level changes between social actors and groups and across their multiple sets 
of rules. To achieve this we identify the ‘inter-institutional gap’ (IIG) that occurs 
when there is an absence of agreed upon ‘rules of the game’ between autono-
mous institutional regimes in a social-ecological system. The IIG  framework 
analytically combines the existing concepts of legal pluralism, institutional void, 
structural hole, and cultural mismatch, and in so doing addresses the limitations 
of these concepts, each of which offers only partial, albeit valuable, insights to 
particular gaps between formal and informal institutions. IIG addresses these 
 shortcomings by accounting for the interactions between formal and informal at 
every rule level We then demonstrate the potential of our framework by applying 
it to four case studies of common property resources that span diverse geographi-
cal locations, governance levels, and social-ecological systems: (1) coastal fishery 
management in South Korea; (2) forest resource management in Bangladesh; (3) 
tiger conservation in India; and (4) wildlife management with Indigenous com-
munities in Canada. We conclude by discussing within- and cross-case insights 
to critically reflect on the overall strengths and limitations of the IIG framework, 
suggesting theoretical directions for future research.
3. Challenges raised by institutional diversity for natural resource 
management
3.1. Three levels of rules-in-use within institutions
Ostrom et al. (1994) proposed that all institutions are arranged in three levels of 
rules including operational choice, collective choice, and constitutional choice. 
Operational choice rules are the day-to-day decision making rules, which deter-
mine the actions of different institutional actors in a system. They are devised 
under the guidance of collective choice rules (Ostrom 2011; Mincey et al. 2013). 
Collective choice rules structure institutional arrangements for rule enforcement. 
Thus, a difference between operational choice and collective choice rules involves 
practicing a right and determining the right to be practiced (Ostrom and Schlager 
1996). These rules are, in turn, formulated under the conditions that constitutional 
choice rules set (Ostrom 2011; Carlsson and Berkes 2005). Constitutional choice 
rules are the highest level of the rule hierarchy, determining who will take part 
in collective choice decision-making processes (Ostrom et al. 1994). While rule 
making at the operational and collective choice levels is an ongoing, and more 
fluid process, at the constitutional choice level there is “less fluid decision making 
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arrangements” (Ostrom 2011, 18). This means operational and collective choice 
rules are subordinate to constitutional choice rules. The three levels of rules-in-
use are nested, reflecting the dynamic nature of rule-making and its influences on 
resource sharing, as well as the need for communication and interaction between 
the multiple actors involved, such as resource-users, managers and stakeholders 
(Ostrom 2010). 
Ostrom et al. (1994) define action as the moves or decisions taken by a ‘player 
in the game’. As Kiser and Ostrom (2000) illustrate, an action in a tennis game 
would include either defending the baseline or charging the net. Actions are 
guided by rules, and actions without any legal guidance is considered a violation 
of rules (Kiser and Ostrom 2000). Importantly, actions at each level are guided by 
the corresponding rule levels (e.g. operational actions are guided by operational 
choice rules) (Schlager and Ostrom 1992). In this paper we characterize non-
constitutional actions as those guided by both operational and collective choice 
rules. Operational actions involve decisions where ‘individuals are authorized to 
take a wide variety of actions at this level without prior arrangements with other 
individuals’ (76) and collective choice actions involve decisions that are taken 
‘to determine, enforce, continue or alter action authorized within institutional 
arrangements’ (76). Further, constitutional actions are guided by “rules governing 
future collective decisions to authorize action” (Kiser and Ostrom 2000) (see also 
Annex 1).
To characterize common-pool resource rule systems, Ostrom et al. (1961) 
and Ostrom (1990) suggested the idea of nested enterprises, arguing that every 
level of institution should possess some degree of rule-devising autonomy 
in order to integrate temporally and spatially generated knowledge. Heltberg 
(2002) further noted that without such rule-making autonomy, there is often a 
lack of coherence between different rule levels leading to potential governance 
failures. However, such autonomy requires mutual recognition, reciprocity, 
and linkages between formal and informal institutions, which have generally 
not surfaced in most existing top-down natural resource management systems 
(Sandberg 2007). 
3.2. Relevant perspectives on institutional mismatches
Various attempts have been made to conceptualize and address the governance 
challenges raised by inter-institutional gaps and mismatches, most notably the 
concepts of legal pluralism, institutional void, structural hole, and cultural mis-
match. Table 1 summarizes the main characteristics of these concepts. Potential 
causes of conflicts related to institutional diversity are further discussed below.
3.2.1. Legal pluralism
Legal pluralism problematizes the co-existence of multiple sets of legal systems, 
or constitutional choice rules, as they apply to the same jurisdiction or resource 
system (von Benda-Beckmann 2002; Bavinck and Gupta 2014). This concept 
A framework for analyzing institutional gaps in natural resource governance 829
Ta
bl
e 1
: S
um
m
ar
y o
f fo
ur
 ex
ist
ing
 co
nc
ep
ts 
us
ed
 to
 ex
pla
in 
na
tur
al 
res
o
u
rc
e 
m
a
n
a
ge
m
en
t c
on
flic
ts 
an
d t
he
ir 
lim
ita
tio
ns
 in
 ap
ply
ing
 th
ree
 le
ve
ls 
of 
ru
les
.
Co
nc
ep
ts
Is
su
es
 a
dd
re
ss
ed
 b
y 
th
e 
co
nc
ep
ts
Po
te
nt
ia
l c
au
se
s o
f c
on
fli
ct
s
Li
m
ita
tio
ns
 o
f t
he
 c
on
ce
pt
s
R
ef
er
en
ce
s
Le
ga
l 
pl
ur
al
ism
R
ec
og
ni
ze
s t
he
 in
te
rp
la
y 
at
 th
e 
co
n
st
itu
tio
na
l-c
ho
ic
e 
ru
le
 le
ve
l b
y 
ad
dr
es
sin
g 
th
e 
co
-e
xi
ste
nc
e 
of
 m
ul
tip
le
 
se
ts
 o
f l
eg
al
 sy
ste
m
s, 
or
 c
on
sti
tu
tio
na
l 
ch
oi
ce
 ru
le
s (
be
tw
ee
n f
orm
al,
 co
difi
ed
, 
an
d 
in
fo
rm
al
, h
ist
or
ic
al
ly
 a
nd
 c
ul
tu
ra
lly
 
ev
o
lv
ed
 in
sti
tu
tio
ns
)
Co
nfl
ic
t a
ris
es
 b
et
w
ee
n 
ac
to
rs
 
o
pe
ra
tin
g 
un
de
r f
or
m
al
 a
nd
 in
fo
rm
al
 
co
n
st
itu
tio
na
l-c
ho
ic
e 
ru
le
s d
ue
 to
 
di
ffe
re
nc
es
 in
 c
od
ifi
ca
tio
n,
 fo
rm
al
ity
,
 
le
ga
lit
y,
 
an
d 
le
gi
tim
ac
y
A
dd
re
ss
es
 m
ul
tip
le
 c
on
sti
tu
tio
na
l 
le
ve
l r
ul
es
 a
nd
 th
ei
r d
iv
er
ge
nt
 
cu
ltu
ra
l a
nd
 k
no
w
le
dg
e 
so
ur
ce
s, 
bu
t n
ot
 th
e 
sp
in
of
f i
nt
o 
di
ve
rg
en
t 
ru
le
 m
ak
in
g 
at
 su
bs
eq
ue
nt
 ru
le
 
le
ve
ls
M
ei
nz
en
-D
ic
k 
an
d 
Pr
ad
ha
n 
20
01
; B
av
in
ck
 
an
d 
G
up
ta
 
20
14
 
In
st
itu
tio
na
l 
v
o
id
Ex
pl
ai
ns
 th
e 
ab
se
nc
e 
or
 la
ck
 o
f 
re
co
gn
iti
on
 o
f c
ol
le
ct
iv
e 
ac
tio
n 
in
iti
at
ed
 
by
 in
fo
rm
al
 a
ct
or
s (
e.g
. c
om
mu
nit
y 
m
em
be
rs
) b
y c
on
sti
tut
ion
al 
ch
oic
e r
ule
s o
f 
fo
rm
al
 in
sti
tu
tio
ns
Co
nfl
ic
t d
ev
el
op
s w
he
re
 th
er
e 
ex
ist
s 
in
su
ffi
ci
en
t o
rg
an
iz
at
io
n,
 in
sti
tu
tio
n,
 o
r 
en
tit
y 
to
 b
rid
ge
 th
e 
ga
p 
be
tw
ee
n 
fo
rm
al
 
co
n
st
itu
tio
na
l c
ho
ic
e 
ru
le
s a
nd
 m
od
er
n 
in
sti
tu
tio
na
l s
pa
ce
s (
e.g
. n
ew
 ac
tor
s, 
m
o
v
em
en
ts
)
Ex
pl
ai
ns
 h
ow
 c
ol
le
ct
iv
e 
ac
tio
n 
is 
in
iti
at
ed
 b
y 
in
fo
rm
al
 a
ct
or
s i
n 
a 
dy
na
m
ic
 a
nd
 c
ha
ng
in
g 
en
vi
ro
nm
en
t 
in
 th
e 
ab
se
nc
e 
of
 a
gr
ee
d 
up
on
 ru
le
s 
bu
t d
oe
s n
ot
 a
dd
re
ss
 g
ap
s a
t o
th
er
 
ru
le
 le
ve
ls 
as
so
ci
at
ed
 w
ith
 th
es
e 
di
ve
rs
e 
ru
le
m
ak
in
g 
in
te
re
sts
H
aje
r 2
00
3, 
20
09
St
ru
ct
ur
al
 
ho
le
Id
en
tifi
es
 th
e 
ro
le
 o
f n
et
w
or
ks
 o
r s
tru
ct
ur
al
 
so
ci
al
 c
ap
ita
l (
i.e
. c
on
ne
cte
dn
ess
 of
 
ac
to
rs
) i
n s
ha
pin
g i
de
as,
 an
d i
nfl
ue
nc
ing
 
in
fo
rm
at
io
n,
 c
om
m
un
ic
at
io
n 
an
d 
m
at
er
ia
l 
re
so
u
rc
e 
flo
w
s a
t t
he
 o
pe
ra
tio
na
l l
ev
el
Co
nfl
ic
t d
ev
el
op
s i
n 
sit
ua
tio
ns
 
w
he
re
 su
bg
ro
up
s o
r c
om
m
un
iti
es
 
ha
ve
 n
o 
co
nn
ec
tio
n 
be
tw
ee
n 
th
em
. 
Th
es
e 
sit
ua
tio
ns
 c
re
at
e 
a 
co
m
pe
tit
iv
e 
ad
va
nt
ag
e 
fo
r a
nd
 o
fte
n 
ab
us
ed
 b
y 
a 
th
ird
 p
ar
ty
 th
at
 b
ro
ke
rs
 th
e 
flo
w
 o
f 
in
fo
rm
at
io
n 
an
d 
co
nt
ro
l t
he
 in
te
ra
ct
io
ns
 
be
tw
ee
n 
th
e 
di
sc
on
ne
ct
ed
 p
ar
tie
s
D
ea
ls 
w
ith
 m
iss
in
g 
ne
tw
or
k 
co
n
n
ec
tio
ns
 th
at
 li
m
it 
kn
ow
le
dg
e 
flo
w
 a
nd
 c
oo
rd
in
at
io
n 
bu
t f
ai
ls 
to
 
de
m
on
str
at
e 
ho
w
 th
is 
di
sc
on
ne
ct
 
m
ay
 re
su
lt 
fro
m
 th
e 
ab
se
nc
e 
of
 
co
m
m
o
n
 u
n
de
rs
ta
nd
in
g 
an
d 
ru
le
 
m
ak
in
g 
be
tw
ee
n 
op
er
at
io
na
l a
ct
or
s
B
ur
t 2
00
0,
 
20
04
Cu
ltu
ra
l 
m
ism
at
ch
Ex
pl
ai
ns
 th
e 
la
ck
 o
f r
ec
og
ni
tio
n 
by
 fo
rm
al
 
in
sti
tu
tio
ns
 o
f i
nf
or
m
al
 c
on
sti
tu
tio
na
l 
ru
le
s a
ss
oc
ia
te
d 
w
ith
 e
th
ni
ca
lly
 d
iv
er
se
 
gr
ou
ps
 in
 p
os
t-c
ol
on
ia
l s
oc
ie
tie
s (
e.g
. 
w
ith
 d
ist
in
ct
 c
ul
tu
ra
l p
ra
ct
ic
es
- r
es
ou
rc
e 
o
w
n
er
sh
ip
, c
ul
tiv
at
io
n 
pa
tte
rn
, a
nd
 sh
ar
in
g 
o
f r
es
ou
rc
es
 a
nd
 o
ut
pu
ts)
Co
nfl
ic
t a
ris
es
 w
he
n 
th
er
e 
is 
in
su
ffi
ci
en
t 
u
n
de
rs
ta
nd
in
g 
or
 a
pp
re
ci
at
io
n 
of
 lo
ca
lly
 
em
be
dd
ed
 c
on
sti
tu
tio
na
l c
ho
ic
e 
ru
le
s 
by
 fo
rm
al
 ru
le
 p
ra
ct
iti
on
er
s, 
re
su
lti
ng
 
in
 fo
rm
al
 p
ra
ct
iti
on
er
s’ 
ex
cl
us
io
n 
fro
m
 
br
oa
de
r i
nf
or
m
al
 c
on
sti
tu
tio
na
l r
ul
es
 
an
d 
pr
ac
tic
es
Ex
pl
ai
ns
 th
e 
fa
ilu
re
 to
 re
co
gn
iz
e 
in
fo
rm
al
 c
on
sti
tu
tio
na
l r
ul
es
 
in
 e
th
ni
c 
di
ve
rs
e 
so
ci
et
ie
s b
ut
 
do
es
 n
ot
 a
dd
re
ss
 h
ow
 c
ul
tu
ra
l 
di
ffe
re
nc
es
 c
an
 in
te
rfe
re
 w
ith
 
co
m
m
o
n
 u
n
de
rs
ta
nd
in
g 
an
d 
ru
le
 
m
ak
in
g 
at
 o
th
er
 ru
le
 le
ve
ls
A
ch
es
on
 2
00
6;
 
M
ill
s e
t a
l. 
20
10
830 H.M. Tuihedur Rahman et al.
emphasizes that there are ‘multiple sources and characteristics of law, varying 
according to degrees of codification, formality, legality, legitimacy, scope, con-
tent and process’, and that law not only emanates from government, but also 
from custom and culture (Bavinck and Gupta 2014, 80). Studies of legal plu-
ralism have mainly focused on the imposition of centralized and codified laws 
of colonial and/or post-colonial governments on the prevailing customary laws 
of indigenous resource users (which are typically unwritten and lacking formal 
structures like institutional hierarchy, bureaucracy and legislation) (Merry 1988; 
Bavinck and Jyotishi 2014). Despite its fairly wide adoption within socio-legal 
scholarship (Merry 1988), the analytical scope of legal pluralism tends to be lim-
ited to the interplay of constitutional choice rules between formal and informal 
institutions. 
3.2.2. Institutional void
Institutional void describes institutional conflict that arises when there are no 
accepted rules and norms to guide how the political process between formal and 
informal institutions operates and when policy measures are yet to be agreed upon 
(Hajer 2003). These conflicts typically operate in the void between the classic 
modernist institutions (i.e. well-crafted hierarchical institutions with codified 
rules of actions for decision making) and modern institutional spaces (character-
ized by the involvement of new actors in decision-making processes who initi-
ate collective action based on informal institutions). An example of such a void 
can be seen when the public acts external to formal institutions to effect change 
(Hajer 2009). Also, Everingham (2009) suggest that such a void may result from 
the absence of an intermediary agency or the presence of a weak agency between 
policy actors and the ground level informal institutional actors. In such cases, 
formal constitutional choice rules (e.g. governmental resource regulatory bodies) 
are unable to appropriately respond to or deal with the collective choice rules of 
the informal institution. More generally, institutional void describes one particu-
lar type of situation where there is insufficient bridging between formal consti-
tutional rules and informal collective choice rules. While there is usefulness in 
the concept, institutional void describes collective choice actions but it does not 
address rules. 
3.2.3. Structural hole
Structural holes exist in a network when two groups of actors (operating across 
formal and informal institutions) are not connected, but there is a third party 
with ties to both parties (Burt 2000, 2004). This disconnect creates a situation in 
which the third party can appropriate or manipulate outcomes by brokering the 
flow of information between these groups. Building on the work of Granovetter 
(1973), Burt (2002) recognized that these holes arise because of network closure 
within well-connected groups. Closure increases homogeneity of belief, behav-
ior, and knowledge; and enhances information flow among group members. In 
natural resource management, structural holes may be at work where pathways 
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used by formal institutional actors (resource managers, scientists) show limited 
effectiveness in disseminating information, effecting change of opinions, beliefs 
and outcomes of informal/customary institutional actors (resource users, com-
munity members). As a result, studies have highlighted the need for high level 
brokering organizations to leverage social capital, and bridge these holes (Barnes-
Mauthe et al. 2015). While the concept of a structural hole is useful for explaining 
an inter-institutional gap that exists between actors operating across formal and 
informal institutions, it does not directly address underlying issues of rule-levels 
and rule-making.
3.2.4. Cultural mismatch
Acheson (2006) and Hodge (2011) indicate a type of rule-level mismatch between 
institutions, termed ‘cultural mismatch’, which focuses on the gap between the 
informal constitutional choice rules and the formal operational or collective 
choice rules. Often, ethnically diverse and post-colonial societies have distinc-
tive cultural practices concerning resource ownership, cultivation patterns and the 
sharing of resources and outputs that can significantly influence their resource use 
decision-making. Due to their local origin and embeddedness, these rules remain 
outside the broader formal institutions and governance adopted at a national scale. 
This often leads to alienation of informal institutions from formal rule making 
processes and a lack of understanding by formal rule practitioners who operates 
under formal operational or collective choice rules. On the other hand, govern-
ment officials can see themselves as the legally-empowered regulative authority 
on behalf of the state and consider resource user communities as subjects of the 
state (Ostrom 1996), thus failing to understand the informal constitutional choice 
rules of local minority communities. This situation can result in a lack of rec-
ognition and consideration of informal constitutional rules by actors operating 
under formal institutions, and conversely the lack of recognition and consider-
ation of formal collective choice rules by actors operating under informal institu-
tions. However, the concept of cultural mismatch does not fully acknowledge the 
gaps between the rule hierarchies, depending instead on behavioral approaches to 
understanding formal and informal actors. 
4. Conceptual framework: inter-institutional gap
While each of these concepts assists in identifying gaps between formal and 
informal institutions, as shown in Table 1, none takes into consideration the 
interactions at every rule level (i.e. constitutional choice, collective choice and 
operational choice rules) between institutional regimes, likely limiting their abil-
ity to effectively characterize inter-institutional gaps. Therefore, in order to go 
beyond the existing concepts and provide a more integrated understanding of the 
different pathways that generate inter-institutional disconnectedness in natural 
resource management, we present the concept of ‘inter-institutional gap’ (see 
Figure 1).
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4.1. Institutions and rule levels
Our IIG framework uses two dimensions of ‘Institution’ previously introduced: 
(1) the ‘formal’ and ‘informal’ categories of institutions (North 1991), and (2) the 
‘constitutional choice’, ‘collective choice’, and ‘operational choice’ rule levels 
identified by Ostrom et al. (1994) (see Section 2.1). First, the framework applies 
the ‘formal’/‘informal’ distinction to categorize institutions, as represented in 
rows. Second, the framework distinguishes constitutional and non-constitutional 
rule levels governing actions according to the three levels of rules-in-use. Across 
the three levels of rule-in-use, the framework combines collective choice-guided 
rules and operational choice-guided rules as non-constitutional rule levels (Kiser 
and Ostrom 2000). We combine these two rule levels for two reasons: first, for 
analytical clarity – as collective and operational choice rules are similar in terms 
of level of rigidity and enforcement. Second, we have not found any  relevant 
Figure 1: Conceptual diagram depicting inter-institutional gap framework, highlighting the 
gap as the function (f) of four possible interactional gaps that could occur between formal and 
informal institutional regimes. These are: (a) gap between formal and informal constitutional 
choice rules (i.e. between ‘constitutional laws’ and ‘customary laws’); (b) between informal 
constitutional choice rules and formal collective and operational choice rules (i.e. ‘customary 
laws’ and ‘binding working rules’); (c) between formal constitutional and informal collec-
tive and operational choice rules (i.e. “constitutional laws’ and ‘social rules/habits’); and (d) 
between formal and informal collective and operational choice rules (i.e. ‘binding working 
rules’ and ‘social rules/habits’). Actions axis involves constitutional (guided by constitutional 
choice rules) and non-constitutional (guided by collective choice and operational choice rules) 
actions.
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theoretical concepts that can precisely identify the gaps between these two 
types of rules. In short, the columns are categorized into constitutional and non- 
constitutional rule levels as a way of capturing the key differences in codification, 
collective decision-making, operation, enforcement and fluidity between these 
types of rules. For example, passing a new codified law in the government is an 
action based on constitutional choice rules that is incorporated into the formal 
institutions (action corresponding to Constitutional-Formal quadrant in Figure 1). 
Elected elders enforcing customary laws is an action based on constitutional 
choice rules within the informal institutions (Constitutional-Informal). Regional 
agricultural extension officers operating under the formal institution’s jurisdiction 
implement, report and enforce the extension office’s operational policies based on 
operational choice decisions that are experience, context- and temporal-specific 
(Non-constitutional-Formal). Fourth, social habits is an example of actions based 
on non-constitutional rules by individuals or communities that are adhering to 
informal institutions that are also experiential, contextual, and temporal-specific 
(Ostrom et al. 1994) (Non-constitutional-Informal).
4.2. Legal pluralism: gap between constitutional rules of both formal 
and informal institutions
In many developing and post-colonial societies, the formal and authoritative con-
stitutional choice rules or laws often do not recognize existing informal (e.g. cus-
tomary and collective action based self-governance) rules, although they are the 
constitutional choice rules in the body of informal institutions. Therefore, these 
two different constitutional choice rules can be identified as the interactive com-
ponents of both formal and informal institutions between which the absence of 
congruence can be aptly explained by the concept of legal pluralism (Figure 1a).
4.3. Institutional void: gap between constitutional rules of formal 
institutions and non-constitutional rules of informal institutions
In a self-governed system, an informal institution has collective choice rules 
for implementing constitutional objectives (e.g. social rules that regulate with-
drawing and conserving of resources for collective benefit). These objectives 
are site- specific and implicated with local resource-use politics. Often, actors 
operating under formal institutions judge these self-governed actions as being 
illegitimate because formal constitutional laws may have completely different 
resource management objectives based on higher-level political generalization 
(e.g. national-level). The absence of synchronization and coordination between 
formal constitutional choice rules and the informal collective choice rules may 
result in one form of inter-institutional gap, aligning with what the literature has 
described as an institutional void. Ostrom et al. (1961) have figuratively char-
acterized this situation as: “there are too many governments and not enough 
 government” (Figure 1b).
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4.4. Structural hole: gap between non-constitutional rules of both formal 
and informal institutions
The flow of resources (e.g. information, knowledge, material resources) between 
actors operating under formal and informal institutions plays a pivotal role in 
mending inter-institutional gaps. However, mediating agencies or brokering 
actors are generally required for ensuring such flow (Cash et al. 2006). For exam-
ple, bureaucrats, on behalf of formal institutions such as governments, often play 
this role, while local leaders do the same for resource-dependent communities. 
Subsequently, government officials and local leaders usually perform the mediat-
ing role, which can be observed as the mix of collective choice and operational 
choice rules. However, the gap can become evident because of the lack of legal 
provision for mediation with the community by ground-level formal institu-
tional actors. This can lead to the lack of government officials’ capacity or their 
reluctance to communicate with local community members, limiting their abil-
ity to bridge the gap between community members and the government since 
the rules do not equip them for required action (Ostrom 1996). In addition, this 
 inter- institutional gap may be exacerbated when local leaders, also as  community 
members and potential users of resources, capitalize on the resource flow and 
hijack the mediation process for their own benefit (Krishna 2002; Rahman et al. 
2015). Community members with relatively low social and human capital are 
generally worse off under such a situation, because they can arbitrate neither 
with the government officials nor with the local leaders (Rahman et al. 2015). 
Therefore, the network closure within these two groups, and lack of information 
flow across them, can be seen as a form of inter-institutional gap, recognized in 
the concept of structural hole (Figure 1c).
4.5. Cultural mismatch: gap between constitutional rules of informal 
institutions and non-constitutional rules of formal institutions 
Many communities and rural societies have their own ingrained customs and 
norms, which they apply to resource governance. As stated earlier, these rules 
may not be recognized by the formal governance system. Conversely, the resource 
users may view the officials as intruders in their land who disrupt their custom-
ary resource-use practices. This situation is particularly evident in common-pool 
resource management where rights of use and exclusion are not clear. Here the 
concept of cultural mismatch can be used to describe the gap associated with a lack 
of common understanding between constitutional choice rules of informal institu-
tions and collective and operational choice rules of formal institutions (Figure 1d).
5. Case study application of the IIG framework
To better address the underlying causes of inter-institutional gaps, we apply the 
framework to four diverse case studies of common property resource governance: 
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(1) coastal fishery management in South Korea; (2) forest resource management 
in Bangladesh; (3) tiger conservation in India; and (4) wildlife management with 
indigenous communities in Canada. For each case we seek to unveil the vari-
ous inter-institutional gaps encountered and underline how the actors addressed 
them (successfully or not). Figure 2 summarizes our interpretation of the inter-
institutional gaps for each case, further described below. Where gaps were identi-
fied, they were then categorized as being: (1) co-existing: a situation where no 
legal or negotiated settlement has been made for coordination among formal 
Case study 1: Fisheries management, South Korea
a) Gusipo fishing community adopt informal constitutional rules guided by 
fisheries authority: legal pluralism latent; b) Formal institution has operational 
guidelines for connecting with Gusipo fishing village cooperative: cultural 
mismatch latent; c) Fisheries authority does not have legal mechanism for 
responding to collective rules of Gusipo cooperative: institutional void not co-
exist; d) No operational mechanism for interacting with community members’ 
collective rules: structural hole co-exist
Case study 2: Protected area management in MNP, Bangladesh
a) Customary Garo institution and formal forest conservation rules separate 
and distinct: legal pluralism co-exist; b) Forest officials are not familiar 
with Garo cultural and social laws: cultural mismatch co-exist; c) Formal 
institution does not have legal? mechanism for responding to communities' 
collective rules: institutional void not resolved; d) No operational 
mechanism for interacting with Garo community members: structural hole 
co-exist
Case study 3: Wildlife conservation in CTR, India 
a) Sole authority of wildlife management belongs to CTR: legal pluralism 
latent; b) Resident communities' resource use objectives align with CTR: 
cultural mismatch latent; c) TCF establish mechanism for responding to 
collective choice rules of communities: institutional void mediated; d) TCF 
establish mechanism for interacting with community members and CTR: 
structural hole mediated
Case study 4: Wildlife co-management in Old Crow, Canada
a) VGFN and federal and provincial government made agreement for joint 
management: legal pluralism mediated; b) PCMB has operational guidelines 
for connecting with VGFN and formal institutions: cultural mismatch 
mediated; c) PCMB mediates the collective rules of VGFN and formal 
institutions: institutional void mediated; d) PCMB bridges interactions between 
VGFN community members and government officials: structural hole 
Legend
Mediated
Latent
Co-exist
mediated
Figure 2: Case study analysis. Mediated: indicates the presence of rules that establishes coor-
dination between formal and informal institutions; Latent: indicates the presence of mediat-
ing actors with non-permanent mediation rules; Co-exist: indicates the complete absence of 
coordination rule.
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and informal institutional actors based on their active involvement. This situa-
tion has the potential for conflicting interactions between formal and informal 
actors; (2) latent: temporary mechanisms or rules (not incorporated into formal 
legal frameworks) exist for coordinating formal and informal actors, particularly 
as a result of the actions of boundary organizations. This situation assumes that 
the disappearance of boundary organizations may bring back the potential for 
conflicting interactions; or (3) mediated: formal rules exist for facilitating coordi-
nation between formal and informal actors. These rules may not completely solve 
 conflicting interactions between the actors, but provide legal directives for media-
tion. Then, following the guidance of Eisenhardt (1989), we conduct a cross-case 
analysis to further test and refine our framework.
5.1. Individual case description and interpretation with the IIG framework
5.1.1. Case study #1: coastal fisheries in South Korea
This case study takes place in the fishing village of Gusipo, located in the Gochang 
County of South Korea (Song 2014). In South Korea, the central government con-
trols the creation and enforcement of fisheries law and regulations, including the 
temporal closed season regulations for swimming crab (Portunus trituberculatus). 
In the village of Gusipo, the government closure spanned June 16 to August 15 in 
2012. However, this rule was increasingly recognized as inconsistent with the local 
fish harvesters’ observations that the crabs were still molting at the end of August. 
As a result, a voluntary agreement between fishers in Gusipo to abstain from fish-
ing until the end of August was reached. Fishers who legally travelled from other 
areas under the government-set permit system dismissed the local agreement and 
started harvesting crab once the official government closure ended, claiming they 
were following national regulations. As a result, Gusipo fishers were forced to 
enter the crab fishing early, driven by a fear of resource scarcity. Local fishers 
approached the central government about amending the national regulations; how-
ever, the revision process required an enactment of ministerial ordinances or a 
tabling of an amendment at the National Assembly – a process too long and cum-
bersome for local fishers to engage in. The inability of the government regulatory 
bodies to respond to the collective decisions of the Gusipo fishers shows a disjunc-
ture between formal constitutional choice rules and informal customary rules (also 
can be recognized as informal constitutional choice rules). Further, different opera-
tional choice rules between these actors, in terms of the formal non-constitutional 
choice rules adhered to by the government and the informal social customs upheld 
by the community, led to a lack of knowledge transfer. Actors that could have 
potentially bridged this knowledge gap, such as local fishery officers, were unable 
to intervene because they were restricted by their particular operational context. 
This is an example of an institutional gap between the formal constitutional rules 
determined by the national fisheries laws and regulations and the informal Gusipo 
fishing village voluntary agreement. The fisheries authority did not have mech-
anisms for responding to the collective choice rules of the Gusipo cooperative 
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and there appeared to be a lack of structural mechanisms for sufficient interaction 
between community members and fisheries officials responsible for informal and 
formal operational-choice rules, respectively.  
5.1.2. Case study #2: protected forest in Bangladesh
Madhupur National Park (MNP) is the second largest national park in Bangladesh 
and a category V Protected Area under the International Union for Conservation 
of Nature (IUCN) classification. In MNP, there are tensions in land resource 
ownership between the Bangladesh Forest Department (BFD) and the local com-
munities, and in particular the ethnic Garo community. Historically, the Garo 
community inhabited the park and they still claim themselves as the rightful own-
ers of the land, although this is not acknowledged by the government (Rahman 
et al. 2014). As a result, the community uses their long-standing informal social 
customs and constitutional choice rules to govern access to land resources (e.g. 
matriarchal land inheritance system), which are at odds with the formal patrilineal 
processes for land sharing (Stavenhagen 2007). Inter-institutional conflict results 
because the formal constitutional choice rules of the BFD and the customary rules 
of the Garo community do not adequately recognize each another. There is also 
a cultural mismatch between the community’s customary rules for land resource 
management and the day-to-day operational choice rules used by the forest offi-
cials to make decisions (Rahman et al. 2014). This situation is made more com-
plex by the recent emergence of new leaders in Garo society (Krishna 2011). 
These new leaders have more modern education and political understanding, tak-
ing over from the older village leaders. However, these new leaders often try 
to control community collective decisions in ways that personally benefit them. 
Increasingly, they are involved in informal land transactions that results in them 
being compensated for giving land to non-Garo buyers. As such, these new lead-
ers do not faithfully represent the community, leading to a lack of leadership in 
representing the community’s customary rules in negotiations with government 
officials. This case illustrates the difficulty faced when informal constitutional 
choice rules set by customary Garo governing bodies and formal forest conser-
vation rules are separate and distinct. Moreover, formal national forest policies 
and regulations do not have sufficient mechanisms to respond to communities’ 
collective choice rules, leading to an inter-institutional gap between formal con-
stitutional choice rules and informal non-constitutional choice rules. Similar to 
case study 1, there appears to be no structural and legal mechanism for interaction 
between Garo community members and forest officials who follow informal and 
formal non-constitutional choice rules, respectively.
5.1.3. Case study #3: wildlife conservation in northern India
The Corbett Tiger Reserve (CTR) is one of the oldest protected areas (PA) in 
India. The CTR landscape serves, among other things, as a major tourist destina-
tion, a global site for tiger conservation and a vital area for local livelihoods (Jhala 
et al. 2011; Rastogi et al. 2014). CTR management has sole authority of wildlife 
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management within the national reserve. A number of local communities histori-
cally reside along the perimeter of CTR, and maintain complex relationships with 
the park ecosystem. The complex interactions involve the formal CTR manage-
ment and the community’s collective demands and actions, as well as the engage-
ment of an NGO. In the past, tensions arose when wild animals, such as elephants, 
wild boars, tigers, and leopards from CTR, attacked the crops or cattle of villag-
ers residing along the periphery. The formal process for compensation set by the 
‘constitutional laws’ of the Corbett Tiger Reserve was deemed far too long, cum-
bersome, and inaccessible for remote village communities, making it difficult for 
many community members to receive any compensation. These issues gave rise 
to social mobilization by community members against animal conservation, lead-
ing to retaliatory killings of animals (Rastogi et al. 2014). In this circumstance, 
the ineffectiveness of formal constitutional choice rules provoked animal hunting, 
as practiced in the past, guided by informal collective choice rules developed by 
the community members. This incongruence of rules even led to the killing of 
tigers, which undermined formal wildlife conservation efforts. 
The Tiger Corbett Foundation (TCF), as a mediating organization, started 
to fulfill some of these inter-institutional gaps. It saw the necessity of provid-
ing interim relief to community-members following a tiger attack. In 1997, TCF 
started an Interim Relief Scheme. Under this scheme, following an attack, the 
aggrieved person would contact TCF, who subsequently dispatched a team to the 
site of attack to document the attack and provide interim relief.  With time, this 
process has proved successful and no retaliatory kills of tigers have been reported 
while the scheme has been in operation. This provides an example of an inter-
institutional gap being filled by an external agency. Meanwhile, there exists a 
mismatch between the formal operational-choice rules of the management offi-
cial’s response process and informal operational rules from the community’s col-
lective demands and actions (an institutional void). TCF bridges this structural 
gap again by engaging on the ground, establishing relationships with both par-
ties (conservation officials and the community) and maintaining communication 
and knowledge flow – its ‘attack report’ is regarded as formal proof of cattle-kill 
by CTR management. Importantly, however, TCF (as an external agency) is not 
accountable to either CTR or the resident communities since TCF operates on a 
voluntary basis, and is neither part of the formal nor informal institutional hier-
archy. The IIG Framework illustrates a latent inter-institutional gap between the 
formal and informal operational-choice rules, which may be intensified if TCF, as 
an external agency, is discontinued or changed. For example, if the compensation 
scheme were to be discontinued, retaliatory killings of wildlife would likely also 
return, risking increased severity of the inter-institutional gap.
5.1.4. Case study #4: indigenous communities in Canada
The Vuntut Gwitchin First Nation (VGFN) is self-governing under the Vuntut 
Gwitchin Government (VGG) in the Yukon Territory of northern Canada. Self-
governing First Nations are defined as ‘governments designed, established and 
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administered by Aboriginal peoples under the Canadian Constitution through a 
process of negotiation with Canada and, where applicable, the provincial govern-
ment’ (Government of Canada 2013). According to this definition, the informal 
customary institutions of this Indigenous group have gone through a process of 
formalization. For example, the VGFN has traditional decision-making structures 
integrated within contemporary forms of government (Government of the Vuntut 
Gwitchin First Nation 2006). For the members of the VGFN, the Porcupine 
Caribou (Rangifer tarandus) holds particular social, cultural and economic sig-
nificance. Over the last thirty years, the management of the Porcupine Caribou 
herd has offered an instructive example of transboundary inter-institutional coop-
eration to manage a shared resource, as it includes two countries, two territories, 
one state, and seventeen aboriginal communities, including the VGFN (Padilla 
and Kofinas 2014). Key formal institutional actors range from the local to the 
 international levels: local (the VGG Natural Resource department), territorial 
(Yukon Fish and Wildlife Management Board), national (Environment Canada), 
and international (International Porcupine Caribou Board) entities. Within the self-
governing  process, informal institutional actors within Indigenous  communities, 
such as the elections of Chief and Council, and the annual General Assembly, 
govern based on informal constitutional choice rules, and hunters base social 
interactions on informal non-constitutional choice rules. Differences in govern-
ment structures, geographies, cultures, and knowledge systems, all can serve as 
gaps that hinder the sustainable management of this resource. In particular, the 
formal collective choice rules for caribou management by federal or territorial 
agencies do not necessarily align with the informal constitutional rules in the 
VGFN (i.e. local rules, often traditional ecological knowledge-based, for caribou 
harvest and management) (Brunet et al. 2014). One strategy to address these gaps 
has been the establishment of the Porcupine Caribou Management Board (PCMB) 
in 1986 to facilitate the co-management of the shared resource with represen-
tatives from Canadian stakeholders. Often, government ministers have deferred 
authority for decision-making to the PCMB, creating room for legal pluralism and 
joint management. Ad-hoc decisions (collective choice rules) made by the PCMB 
to address stakeholder concerns may not necessarily align with the formal consti-
tutional rules from the federal government. For instance, PCMB has the responsi-
bility to negotiate shared management actions, such as a harvest management plan 
that specifies what operational actions will be taken (e.g. hunting closures, sex 
limitations) if the abundance estimates of the herd reach particular levels. In this 
case, the IIG framework helps illustrate how a mediating agency, by developing 
common understandings and shared rules (like the PCMB), can broker the gaps 
between formal and informal institutions across rule levels.
5.2. Cross-case analysis
In each of our four case studies, two or more institutional gaps were identified 
indicating the need for a framework to help understand and categorize the various 
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pathways through which gaps can occur and result in an IIG. The following cross-
case analysis identifies three key lessons: (i) gaps are co-existing; (ii) some gaps 
may reveal hidden ones; and (iii) intermediaries may be key to both addressing 
and creating inter-institutional gaps.
5.2.1. Inter-institutional gaps are co-existing
Our case study analysis using the IIG Framework highlights the co-existence of 
two or more gaps or potential interactions across formal and informal institutions, 
something that existing concepts do not sufficiently take into account. Across all 
four cases we found patterns of these associations.
For instance, in the case of MNP, complex tensions in land resource own-
ership between the government (the Bangladesh Forest Management) and the 
local communities (notably the ethnic Garo community) can be seen. Actors 
operating under formal and informal institutions are established with aims that 
are partly distinct: the forest management’s formal constitutional choice rules 
aim mainly to preserve the forest and its resources, while the community’s infor-
mal  constitutional and non-constitutional choice rules protect the community’s 
livelihoods. Customary and formal forest conservation rules co-exist but are 
distinct; therefore, legal pluralism is found. The legal pluralism observed at the 
constitutional choice rule level reveals a second inter-institutional gap between 
informal constitutional and formal operational choice rules. Indeed, forest offi-
cials do not recognize Garo customary rules for land resource management; 
subsequently they are not familiar with their cultural and social practices (e.g. 
matriarchal land hereditary rules; land conversion and cultivation techniques) 
(Rahman et al. 2014). The concept of legal pluralism addresses the tension 
between the formal government and the ethnic Garo institutions by identifying 
inter-institutional gaps between the formal and informal constitutional choice 
rules. However, the interplay between informal constitutional and formal opera-
tional choice-level rules remains obscured, illustrating one type of co-existing 
inter-institutional gap. This case also has a third inter-institutional gap, as the 
government does not recognize Garo’s operational and collective choice rules. 
Decision-makers in formal institutions do not acknowledge their responsibility 
to know the collective demands of the community. As a result, operational-
level officials (local-level forest officers) are not mandated by existing rules to 
establish or bridge this missing connection with the Garo community, resulting 
in a fourth inter-institutional gap. Together, one gap exacerbates another gap, 
resulting in another type of co-existing inter-institutional gap, and the entire 
institutional interactions end up with hierarchical gaps. Without agreed-upon 
mechanisms to address these gaps, the community has pursued self-organized 
paths of communication to voice their disagreement (e.g. demonstration and 
rallies in MNP). 
Through the institutional void concept, Hajer (2003) recognized the participa-
tive nature of the new order of politics that challenges governments and policy-
makers to adapt to the changing nature of decision-making. Our study has built 
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on Hajer’s concept of institutional void by incorporating diverse rule levels into 
decision-making. In doing so, our case studies identified the co-existing nature 
of rules underlying resource governance systems. Furthermore, our cases build 
on the concept of structural holes (Burt 2000, 2004) to illustrate that they can 
arise in the absence of mutually-agreed upon rules between formal and infor-
mal non-constitutional choice rules. In short, when constitutional-choice rules 
insufficiently acknowledge community-level context and demands, it generally 
leads to co-existing gaps. These gaps can be observed between formal operational 
choice rules and informal collective choice rules, where operational-level officials 
are not mandated, nor do they have the necessary agency, to establish missing 
connections with local communities. The cases serve to demonstrate that inter- 
institutional gaps are closely associated with one another and reveal that where 
there is legal pluralism, cultural mismatch is likely; and when there is an institu-
tional void, structural holes are likely.
5.2.2. Some inter-institutional gaps may reveal hidden ones
Applying the IIG framework to our case studies also reveals that some inter-
institutional gaps may be hidden or latent. In the case of Corbett Tiger Reserve 
in India, we found latent inter-institutional gaps that present as legal pluralism, 
cultural mismatch, and structural hole. Different stakeholders wanted to optimize 
different aspects of the Reserve. Since the government is the sole management 
authority, and its objectives complement those of the community, the mediat-
ing rules between the constitutional levels potentially become unnecessary. The 
benefits derived from the community as a result of the positive externality of 
conservation can help explain this arrangement (Agrawal 2001). Subsequently, 
issues of legal pluralism and cultural mismatch in this context are latent. While 
the objectives of formal and informal actors are parallel and distinct at the con-
stitutional choice level, the absence of agreed-upon rules appeared at the collec-
tive choice-level of informal institutions and constitutional choice-level of formal 
institutions because of their divergent objectives. For example, CTR management 
is concerned with preserving the tiger while the community is concerned with the 
safety of livestock, life and property. These distinct objectives are, again, latent or 
not considered a problem as long as there is no interaction between wildlife and 
communities’ goods. However, during wildlife attacks, a tiger may destroy prop-
erty of community members, who respond with killing it (or another tiger). This 
disrupts CTR’s objective of conservation and tensions arise. Such crises reveal a 
lack of agreed-upon rules between the two institutions, more precisely the inflex-
ible formal institutional process for compensation and local community’s collec-
tive choice actions of killing the tiger in response to wildlife attacks. 
In the case of South Korea, a different process occurred but with similar out-
comes: legal pluralism is latent, and institutional void and structural hole emerged 
during crises. Here, the central government has constitutional authority and rule 
making power over the creation and enforcement of fisheries law and regula-
tions. But the community and government came to an agreement, which resulted 
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in the community being allowed to design its’ own rules as long as they com-
plied with the official regulations. This aligns well with the increasing call for 
decentralization in natural resource management (Sekhar 1998; Ribot 2003), 
which attempts to satisfy the institutional void between formal and informal 
institutions by: (i) including increasing efficiency and equity in natural resource 
management (Huther and Shah 1998), (ii) improving service delivery (Smoke 
and Lewis 1996), and (iii) growing participation and contributing to democracy 
(Ribot 2002). However, the decentralization process cannot be completely effec-
tive when there is an absence of coordination between the formal constitutional 
choice rules (fishery regulations) and the informal collective choice rules. In this 
case, the community adopted the informal collective choice rule recognized by 
the government. However, they had no means to enforce their voluntary agree-
ment aiming to postpone fishing, prolonging the period of crab molting. They 
had no power to impede external fishers to exploit the resource. This resulted in 
an outcome much like the Indian case (#3): the government operated as the sole 
authority managing this resource, and considers mediating rules at constitutional 
levels as unnecessary. But with exogenous variables on the system (Hagedorn 
2013) such as crises and uncertainty, this can trigger serious conflicts or damages 
on the resource systems.
5.2.3. Intermediaries play key roles in addressing and creating  
inter-institutional gaps
In two of our cases, intermediaries played important roles in decreasing the poten-
tial for inter-institutional gaps in the form of structural holes and institutional 
voids. 
In the case of the VGFN, the Porcupine Caribou Management Board plays 
the role of intermediary, under a co-management scheme. Through this mediat-
ing agency, common understandings and shared rules have been developed that 
may serve to broker the gaps between formal and informal institutions across 
rule levels. In so doing it is possible to develop common understanding that 
is necessary for negotiating resource management by different users within an 
interdependent action situation. Common understandings may grow from a his-
tory of shared experiences, enhanced by common terms that result from common 
expectations. This is necessary because of the difficulties associated with play-
ing ‘a game without coming to a common understanding of the rules’ (Kiser and 
Ostrom 2000). 
The PCMB was developed specifically to address the gaps between differ-
ent levels of institutions effectively linking higher-level processes of decision 
making with local-level decision-making to achieve regional consensus on 
herd management decisions (Kofinas 2005). The Board’s broad representation 
and role as a communication and coordination body enabled elected officials 
and government ministries to build a level of inter-institutional trust and defer 
authority for decision-making (Kofinas 1998). This speaks to the importance 
of having an intermediary body that can make ad-hoc decisions (collective 
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choice rules) that respond to stakeholder concerns, demonstrating some flex-
ibility within the formal (and often rigid) constitutional rules. The Board is 
then able to create agreed-upon management plans before a crisis occurs, as 
well as prioritize informal harvest management (e.g. through education cam-
paigns, discouraging particular harvest practices) over more formal regulation 
and enforcement. While this may create some legal pluralism in the manage-
ment of the wildlife resource, we do not observe this as necessarily negative as 
it responds to the system complexity. Although conflicts still occur, the PCMB 
demonstrates a case where engaging all stakeholders (including resource-users) 
in co-management can be effective. This situation contrasts with the case from 
South Korea in which there was no mediation between the formal constitutional 
choice rules of the government and the collective choice rules of the fishers with 
regards to postponing the crab harvest.
In the case of Corbett Tiger Reserve, India, the Corbett Foundation provides 
interim relief to community members following an attack by wildlife,  alleviating 
the effects of the formal institution’s inability to respond to the collective 
choice rules of the community. This intermediary reduced the gaps created by 
 institutional voids and structural holes. However, it is also not accountable to 
either the formal or informal institutions. As donor and grant-based operations 
such as the Corbett Foundation can be discontinued on relatively short notice 
when their funding ends, insufficient preparation by local communities and gov-
ernment for an intermediary’s exit may manifest latent inter-institutional gaps or 
exacerbate existing management challenges. In Bangladesh, new leaders were 
found to have replaced village leaders to play important bridging roles between 
community members and government officials. However, they also tended to 
take advantage of their position to enrich themselves at the expense of other 
villagers. In this case, they tended to create inter-institutional gaps rather than 
resolve them.
6. Discussion
6.1. Contribution of the IIG framework to understanding inter-institutional 
interactions
Addressing inter-institutional gaps is far from simple. The problem with authorita-
tive, centralized and hierarchical governance is that it tries to establish homogenous 
and uniform rule systems across diverse resource systems, although each might 
already have locally-based, heterogeneous, and contextualized informal manage-
ment institutions in place (Agrawal 2001). Huitema et al. (2009) considered these 
‘classic modernist’ approaches to institutional design (e.g. the structure of formal 
institutions in many post-colonial countries) as unfeasible, ineffective, and ineffi-
cient. IIG provides a more in-depth analytical lens through which to view the rule-
based behaviours of multi-dimensional institutions. Even when there is a desire 
among formal institutions to achieve coherence of rules by incorporating actors 
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operating within informal institutions in formal decision-making processes, an 
inter-institutional gap may persist if there is an absence of common understanding 
and shared experiences between the community and government. In the absence 
of common understandings and experiences, actions by formal governments that 
involve smaller groups may serve to reinforce power differences and engrained 
power hierarchies in colonial contexts (Helmke and Levitsky 2004). Traditional 
knowledge scholarship emphasizes this situation (Nadasdy 1999).
Our case studies show that the IIG framework is able to account for the vari-
ous interactions occurring between inter-institutional gaps. Some of these interac-
tions are closely associated: where there is a gap between the constitutional choice 
rules of formal and informal institutions, a gap between informal constitutional 
choice and formal non-constitutional choice rules is likely; and when there is a 
gap between formal constitutional choice and informal non-constitutional choice 
rules, a gap between formal and informal non-constitutional choice rules is likely. 
The IIG framework thus supports the insight of Ostrom et al. (1961) that the 
degree to which polycentric institutions:
….function independently, or instead constitute an interdependent sys-
tem of relations…[depends on] the extent that they take each other into 
account in competitive relationships, enter into various contractual and 
cooperative undertakings or have recourse to central mechanisms to resolve 
 conflicts...(p. 831)
In light of this integrated understanding of the interdependence of institutions, 
we argue that if a structural hole is resolved, the problem of institutional void 
might be mediated. This is because the decision-makers in formal institutions may 
use local-level officials as mediating agents for the transfer or exchange of infor-
mation with communities. This intervention ultimately will serve as an indirect 
communication network between informal institutions and the formal govern-
ment. Similarly, when formal government recognizes legal pluralism, it actually 
acknowledges the existence of cultural diversity, or the locally-embedded cultural 
system. In so doing, it enhances incorporation of customary or informal constitu-
tional rules into the operational and collective activities of local-level government 
officials, and opens up opportunities to negotiate a cultural mismatch.
6.2. Mediation to address inter-institutional gaps
Our study of inter-institutional gaps highlights the importance of mediation 
between formal and informal institutions to establish rules at all levels needed 
to regulate the management of natural resources. When these are absent, bureau-
crats and local leaders may attempt to develop informal socially-binding rules 
to perform a mediating role between formal and informal institutions (Krishna 
2011; Rahman et al. 2015). However, due to the lack of constitutional choice rules 
mandating their communication, government officials may also become reluctant 
to bridge the gap with local community members (Ostrom 1996).
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As a result, attempts to mediate by interested actors may face problems of 
legitimacy and representativeness, as noted by Ribot (2002): ‘[if] self-interested, 
no representative, or autocratic institutions such as interest groups, nongov-
ernmental organizations (NGOs), or customary authorities, are chosen in the 
absence of overseeing representative bodies, there is a risk of strengthening 
their autocracy and weakening democracy. Pluralism without representation 
favors the most organized and powerful groups. It favors elite capture’. A lack of 
accountability tends to render the social actors and groups (and thus the manage-
ment of the resource) vulnerable to a re-emergence of the institutional gaps if 
mediators decide to relocate or disappear. Further, even when mediators remain, 
the lack of meaningful involvement of local users reduces the legitimacy of deci-
sions made.
While previous studies have identified the importance of establishing 
‘boundary’ or ‘bridging’ organizations at different levels and scales to enhance 
 accountability, legitimacy and facilitate the co-production of knowledge (Cash 
2001; Folke et al. 2005), the application of our framework highlights the need 
for overarching congruence between and among the different rule levels of 
multiple institutions to better guide the complexity of natural resource gover-
nance. Ultimately there is a need for more collaborative institutional arrange-
ments that are capable of enabling flexibility and innovation in the face of 
environmental change (Adger et al. 2005), while also ensuring accountability 
and transparency. 
7. Conclusion
Understanding the complex interactions between formal and informal institutions 
is one of the persisting challenges facing sustainable natural resource manage-
ment, policy and governance. In many regions around the world, conflict between 
actors operating under formal and informal institutions continues to be observed, 
despite the many calls for fostering meaningful interactions between these groups 
to enhance the long-term sustainable use of natural resources and the adaptive 
capacity of resource users (Dietz et al. 2003; Cash et al. 2006). In this paper we 
presented the Inter-Institutional Gap (IIG) framework as an integrated approach 
to conceptualizing the often overlooked interconnectivity of rule-level changes 
between formal and informal institutions and across their multiple sets of rules 
used in a social-ecological system. The IIG enhances the analytical capacity of 
existing SES framework by highlighting how (the absence of) rules inform dif-
ferent inter-institutional gaps (and their interactions). Our application of the IIG 
framework to diverse natural resource governance case studies reveals that an IIG 
can be created when there are unintended, unforeseen or hidden gaps between 
different rule hierarchies in two or more simultaneously operating institutions. 
Individual case study analyses highlight multi-scalar interactions between rules 
and the resulting inter-institutional gaps. Additionally, from our cross-case analy-
sis we observed that: (i) inter-institutional gaps are nested and may be hierarchal, 
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therefore if a certain gap is identified, other gaps may be expected; (ii) certain 
gaps may reveal latent gaps; and (iii) intermediaries may be key to addressing 
inter-institutional gaps (or creating them). 
This paper presents the initial foundation of the IIG framework, and, there-
fore, calls for further refinement and validation through field experimentation and 
observation to improve our understanding of the different sets of conditions that 
may give rise to an IIG, how local ecological knowledge may intersect with pat-
terns of rule-making to shape natural resource outcomes, as well as identifying 
potentially innovative local responses to an IIG which may be relevant to other 
natural resource contexts. It is also important to further characterize the hierarchal 
nature of IIG in order to identify potential areas for policy action necessary to 
overcoming gaps between rule levels. For future application of this framework in 
a specific case we suggest identifying the scales at which institutions are operating 
and the different levels of rules they are using in order to generate descriptions of 
rules, actors and actions across scales and levels. These descriptions can be used 
to identify potential rule-based discrepancies in managing negotiations between 
formal and informal actors.  
In summary, we believe the IIG framework can facilitate more comprehen-
sive understandings of multi-level and multi-scale and collaborative governance 
structures in addressing complex natural resource management issues. In doing 
so, it has the potential to help policy-makers, practitioners, and researchers assess 
the various ways that gaps across institutions emerge and also contribute to the 
identification of potential areas where the coordination of formal and informal 
institutions could be improved. 
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Annex 1: Glossary
Action: moves or decisions taken by a player in the game. For example, an action 
in tennis would include either defending the baseline or charging the net. Action 
taken without any rule guidance is a violation at all rule levels (Kiser and Ostrom 
2000).
Non-constitutional action: comprises operational choice actions (first level) and 
collective choice actions (second level).
Operational choice actions: “individuals are authorized to take a wide variety of 
actions at this level without prior arrangements with other individuals” (Kiser and 
Ostrom 2000, 76). Seeking compensation from TCF following a tiger attack on 
cattle is an example of an operational choice action of an aggrieved community 
member (see Case study #3).
Collective choice actions: individuals are authorized “to determine, enforce, con-
tinue or alter action” as directed by existing rules (Kiser and Ostrom 2000, 76). In 
the case of MNP, the new roles and actions of new leaders in land right transac-
tions on behalf of the community is an example of collective choice action under 
an informal institution (see Case study #2).
Constitutional action (third level action): individuals are authorized to make 
rules governing collective actions and future decision  making (Kiser and Ostrom 
2000). For example, the authority to institute an annual “closed season” through 
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temporal closure of crab fishing  activities even by licensed harvesters under the 
formal constitutional rules of the South Korean government is a constitutional 
action (see Case study #1).  
Institutions: rules of the game which is used by individuals to guide their actions 
and decisions (North 1991).
Formal institutions: as a de jure body of rulemaking and enforcement in a hierar-
chical organizational structure, usually accompanied by codified norms of behav-
ior and bureaucratic polity (North 1991).
Informal institutions: a rule system that largely lacks official codification, and thus 
typically comprises habitual, verbalized, or customary rules, codes, and conducts, 
which function as the de facto rulemaking and enforcement body (North 1991).
Polycentric: different centers of decision-making which are formally independent 
of each other (Ostrom et al. 1961).
Rule: a coercion mechanism that prompts a decision by directing whether an 
action is allowed or not allowed.
Rule levels: based on Ostrom et al. (1994)’s multi-level rule hierarchy, where 
institutions are arranged into three layers of ‘rules-in-use’: operational choice, 
collective choice, and constitutional choice rules.
